
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**New Faces XI (2010) Dissertation Abstracts**

**Max Abrahms**, Stanford University, International Relations

“*Why Terrorism Still Does Not Work: Implications for Research and Policy.”*

My dissertation challenges our most basic understandings of terrorism with respect to its consequences, motives, and the optimal government response.  These three lines of inquiry are closely interrelated because it is widely accepted that the outcome of terrorism reveals its appeal, which counterterrorism measures ought to divest in order to minimize the incentive for this violent behavior. Within both the academic and policy communities, the dominant post-9/11 paradigm on terrorism is what I have identified as the Strategic Model.  This model posits that (1) terrorism is an effective tactic for groups to coerce political concessions; (2) aggrieved groups are therefore turning to terrorism to maximize their political return; and (3) the international community can thus counter terrorism by divesting its political utility relative to nonviolence via peace processes, democracy promotion, or a strict no-concessions policy in the face of terrorism.  The first section of my dissertation challenges the external validity of the Strategic Model, particularly its underlying premise that terrorism is an effective method for groups to compel political concessions.  My principal finding is that terrorist campaigns are an inherently unproductive coercive tactic because governments resist complying when their civilians are the focus of substate attack.  The second section of the dissertation proposes and tests two original theories for why rational organizations use terrorism despite its suboptimal political return.  And the third section explores the counterterrorism implications if the Strategic Model is indeed wrong, and my theories on the causes of terrorism are right.

**Kathryn McNabb Cochran**, Duke University, Political Science

“*Strong Horse or Paper Tiger? The Reputational Effects of War Outcomes.”*

This dissertation examines whether war has reputational consequences by analyzing the conditions under which third party actors are more or less likely to challenge combatants after the war is over. In it I develop a theory of reputational effects that emphasizes how information generated during wartime interacts with expectations and the characteristics of third party states to determine when war outcomes influence the decision making of potential challengers.  The relevance of unexpected information about the combatants’ military effectiveness is a function of environmental characteristics such as terrain and demography while the relevance of unexpected information about combatants’ revealed cost tolerance is a function of the political context including the issues under contention and the balance of power. I test this theory against competing explanations using three methodological approaches.  First, I analyze the effect that the outcomes of conventional wars have on the initiation of militarized disputes using cross-national time series data from 1816-2004.  Second, I combine qualitative historiography with time series intervention analysis to assess whether the Vietnam War and the Winter War increased or decreased the number of challenges initiated against the United States and Russia.  Finally, I use process tracing to assess whether the decision making by particular challengers in the aftermath of these wars is consistent with the causal logic of my theory.

**Katherine Epstein,** The Ohio State University, Military History

*"Inventing the Military-Industrial Complex: Torpedo Development, Property Rights, and Naval Warfare in the United States and Great Britain before World War I."*

My dissertation, explores the birth of the military-industrial complex and its implications for naval warfare.  The industrialization of warfare in the latter half of the nineteenth century placed a new premium on adequate research and development (R&D) for naval weapons which, like torpedoes, were often highly sophisticated and intended for mass production.  Despite the common depiction of a declining Britain and a rising United States in this period, Britain actually had a decided edge over the United States in naval-industrial R&D resources.  This enabled it to perfect existing technology and test new technology, while the United States had to take technological gambles.  Precisely this pattern occurred with torpedo technology.  In both countries, moreover, the effort to create an adequate R&D infrastructure drew the state and society into a new kind of collaborative relationship: instead of buying weapons from the private sector as finished commercial product, the state invested in new weapons at the experimental stage.  The participation of multiple parties in the process of invention made it very difficult to establish ownership and therefore raised new and difficult questions about property rights.  Torpedo development spawned multiple patent infringement lawsuits, including two that went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Finally, the tactical and strategic implications of torpedoes revolutionized the meaning and metrics of naval power.

    
**Patrick Johnston,** Harvard University and Stanford University  
*“Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsurgency Campaigns* .”

Is killing or capturing enemy leaders an effective military tactic? Previous research on interstate war and counterterrorism suggests that targeting enemy leaders does not work. Drawing on newly collected data on counterinsurgency campaigns, I conduct new analysis on the effectiveness of leadership decapitation. My results challenge the conventional wisdom in two ways. First, counterinsurgents who kill or capture insurgent leaders are significantly more likely to defeat insurgencies than those who fail. Second, my results suggest that insurgent lethality drops when insurgent leaders are successfully removed but not when counterinsurgents mount failing bids to remove them. This finding is robust to numerous estimation strategies and model specifications. Although leadership decapitation is not a silver bullet, when taken together these results suggest that leadership decapitation helps counterinsurgents achieve their twin goals of degrading insurgent organizational capability and reducing insurgent violence. The paper concludes with a discussion of the academic and policy implications of the results.

**Rosemary A. Kelanic**, University of Chicago, Political Science

“*No Oil for War: The Coercive Potential of Energy.”*

Does oil hold special coercive potential, and if so, why? Could a country use the threat of oil cutoff to blackmail its enemies?  My dissertation argues that oil does offer significant coercive leverage, but not through the threat of economic punishment, as many assume. Rather, oil’s coercive potential derives from the devastating consequences cutoffs can have for a target’s military effectiveness – and thus its ability to win wars.  If a state could cut off oil to its adversary, it could immobilize its military and render it unable to achieve victory on the battlefield. The project demonstrates these claims empirically through qualitative historical research that shows how access to oil has shaped the objectives and strategies of the major powers since the early 20th century. I argue that the conduct of World War I, the first mechanized war, was pivotal in demonstrating to the great powers the unique importance of oil for military victory. But ultimately, it was Japan’s experience in WWII that truly became every oil-importing country’s worst nightmare: the severance of Japan’s oil supply by the Allied blockade explains its leaders’ decision to surrender in the time and manner that they did. However, coercive success with oil is rare because states are strategic actors and are cognizant of this danger and take anticipatory measures to secure their supplies *before* coercion can happen in hopes of averting it. My research demonstrates that these anticipatory measures explicitly aimed to counter the threat of military coercion and not simply to forestall economic punishment.

**Peter Krause,** Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Political Science, International Relations and Comparative Politics

*“The Political Effectiveness of Non-state Violence: Terrorism, Insurgency, and the Pursuit of Power.”*

This dissertation analyzes the political effectiveness of violence employed by non-state actors. Most armed groups pursue strategic objectives that benefit their larger social movements, such as ending military occupations or discriminatory government policies, while they simultaneously pursue organizational objectives that benefit the groups themselves, such as bringing in money and recruits. This dissertation presents a two-level framework that captures these dynamics and yields theories based on combinations of group objectives, strength, and strategy that explain significantly greater variation in the political effectiveness of non-state violence than previous scholarship. The framework and its associated theory are analyzed using four longitudinal case studies of Palestinian groups—Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Hamas, and the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP)—who seek a number of shared strategic objectives while simultaneously competing over their organizational interests. These case studies, based on interviews and archival work from over a year of fieldwork in Jordan, Israel, the West Bank, and Lebanon, reveal the trade-offs these groups face in their attempts to achieve their stated goals of establishing a Palestinian state while still surviving (and hopefully thriving) as political actors. Statistical analyses of existing databases on political violence provide further support for the theory and framework against existing alternatives, which hold that certain forms of non-state violence—from terrorism to insurgency—generally work or do not work. This project enhances our understanding of the success and failures of terrorism, armed groups and their affiliated social movements, and provides insight into the trajectories of current and future campaigns.

**Jennifer Miller**, University of Wisconsin-Madison, History

*“Creating the Cold War State: The United States and Japan,  1952 – 1963.”*

 This dissertation, entitled "Creating the Cold War State: The United States and Japan, 1952 - 1963," explores connections between the military, political, cultural, and social facets of the U.S.-Japanese alliance during the decade after the U.S. occupation of Japan (1952-1963).  In emphasizing the multifaceted nature of the U.S.-Japanese relationship, this project has two key goals.  First, it frames the relationship through a lens of bidirectional influence, creating a new framework of U.S.-Japanese relations that highlights the interests and priorities held by both state’s government and people.  Second, it expands this relationship beyond the governmental level to explore the impact that various socio-political groups, such as labor unions and intellectuals, both exerted and experienced within this relationship.  In doing so, it focuses on the intersections between U.S. efforts to develop and implement policy in Japan, negotiations with the Japanese government, and Japanese reactions to the U.S.-Japanese relationship and U.S. Cold War strategy to emphasize how the total nature of the Cold War not only altered diplomacy, but led to the creation of new institutions, knowledge, and socio-political organizations.  This project thus explores the ways in which the Cold War brought the United States and Japan together in both cooperation and conflict to consider how the complex dynamics of Cold War-era international relationships altered society and the state itself.

**Aaron Rapport,** The University of Minnesota, Political Science

*“Planning in the Shadow of the Future:  U.S. Military Interventions and Time Horizons.”*

Rapport’s dissertation examines how elite policymakers in the U.S. government have historically dealt with transitions from combat operations to “post-conflict” activities in major military interventions, and specifically how key decision-makers have gone about assessing the costs and risks associated with the latter stages of a campaign.  Drawing from research in psychology, he argues that senior decision-makers who highly value the future—or more colloquially, are "farsighted"—place increasingly more weight on the desirability, rather than feasibility, of their policy aims as they evaluate operations that are further removed in time.  Conversely, policymakers working with short time horizons are more apt to attend to the feasibility of proposed actions, but often have difficulty grasping and articulating the connection between low-level operations and the ultimate goals of an intervention.  Both biases make it difficult for policymakers to judge whether the costs of consolidating victory, or “securing the peace,” are justified by the value of their ends.